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AND INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

NATURE OF THE CASE
These two cases involve the interpretation of Section
35-1-69, Utah Code Ann.

( 1953), as it pertains to reimburse-

ment to the insurance carriers from the Second Injury Fund on
factors

such as the employees'

age,

education,

intelligence

and job availability.
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DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The commission apportioned compensation and medical
expenses in proportion to the disability caused by the industri
accident and the proportion of disability under Section 35-1-69
Utah Code Ann.

(1953), which was pre-existing.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendants on appeal, Industrial Commission of Utah and
Second Injury Fund seek an affirmance of the rulings of the
Industrial Commission.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Re:

Northwest Carriers, Inc.

(Merz)

Herbert Merz sustained an industrial injury to his back
on August 11, 1974 while employed by Northwest Carriers, Inc.
A medical panel report found Merz to have a 55 percent
impairment with 40 percent of that impairment due to

u,_ ; ,,_

dustrial injury of August 11, 1974, and 15 percent impairment
as the result of a prior industrial accident.

The prior injury

was incurred in 1963 while working for the Utah Highway Departmer
and compensation and medical expenses were paid.
The plaintiff, State Insurance Fund, is now asking reimbursement of 60 percent of compensation and medicals instead c
the 15 percent awarded by the Industrial Commission.
Re:

Melvin E. Ingersoll (Camp)
Mr. Camp incurred an industrial accident on August 6,

He was found to have a 68 percent loss of bodily function with
three percent of the 68 percent being pre-existing psychiatric
problems.

The State Insurance Fund is asking reimbursement of
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B

32 percent of advances for medical expenses and temporary total
compensation instead of the three percent

awarded

by

the

Industrial Commission.
ARGUMENT
AGE, EDUCATION, INTELLIGENCE, JOB
AVAILABILITY, ETC. ARE NOT FACTORS
IN AWARDING MEDICAL AND TEMPORARY
TOTAL DISABILITY PAYMENTS TO BE
PAID BY SECOND INJURY FUND.
Utah Code Ann.

(1953), Section 35-1-69, provides that

the second injury "special fund" shall be applicable to an
injured worker who has:
. . previously incurred a
permanent incapacity by accidental
injury, disease, or congenital causes
. . . which results in permanent incapacity which is substantially greater
than he would have incurred if he had
not had the pre-existing incapacity.
'Plaintiffs assert that a number of pre-existing problems
of the applicants in both cases have resulted in substantially
greater incapacity than would have occurred absent those problems.
Among the pre-existing conditions cited by the plaintiffs, are
age, education, intelligence quotient, job availability, personality, problems (troubled childhood, unsuccessful marriages, inability to undergo rehabilitation), lack of skills, alcoholism
and drug abuse, and a previous back injury.

The prior back injury

noted by the plaintiffs is a previously incurred "accidental
injury" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.

(1953), Section 35-

1-69, and if it has resulted in a substantially greater injury
than would have resulted without it, the "special fund" will be
liable for the related medical care and compensation.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the camp case, the plaintiffs cite a pre-existing
factor to be the applicant's having obtained only a fourth gra~
education and his sole skill being that of a journeyman bricklayer.

The limited education and skills of the applicant do no

qualify as "accidental injuries, disease, or congenital causes•
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.

(1953), Section 35-1-69.

They are pre-existing conditions that are part of the indi vidua:
In Morello v. Baldanza Bakery, Inc. , l O5 N. J. , supra, 5
253 A.2d 583 (1969), the New Jersey court dealt with the issue
of whether its "special fund" was liable to the petitioner for
compensation due to his injured left arm and hand because he wa:
unable to speak, understand or write English.

The court held

that it could discern no legislative intent to make the special
fund liable for payment of part of an employee's total disabiH
where the pre-existing factor was solely the poor literacy or
low intelligence quotient of the injured employee.

in the instant cases, Utah Code Ann.

Similarily,

(1953), Section 35-1-69,

demonstrates no legislative intent to hold Utah's "special fund'
liable where the factor at issue is the poor education and lack
of skill of the injured worker.
Plaintiffs cite the age of applicants as being another
factor substantially increasing incapacity.

Obviously, age is

not an "accidental injury, disease, or congenital cause" such
that Utah"s special fund will be liable to the applicant for
compensation.
The Kentucky court in Young v. Scotia coal co. , Ky. , 46 1
S.W. 2d 796 (1971) dealt with the issue of whether a pre-existb
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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condition attributable to normal aging was a disease condition
within the meaning of its special fund provision.
that aging was not a disease.

The court held

In the present cases, plaintiffs

do not assert that the applicants' age has resulted in any degenerative condition.
ing condition.

They allege that age alone is a pre-exist-

Surely Utah's legislature did not intend that the

"special fund" be liable for the natural aging process and normal
wear and tear on the human body.
In Larson's Workman Compensation he designates a heading
as:
AGE,Effects of: not a pre-existing condition 59.20.This
is explained in the text as follows:
"to be apportionable, then, an impairment
must have been independently producing
some degree of disability before the
accident, and must continue to operate as
a source of disability after the accident."
P. 10-285, Vol. 2
There is no evidence in this case at all that applicant's
age, education and experience were independently producing some
degree of disability before the accident.
Plaintiffs refer to a number of the applicants' personal
problems which predated the industrial accident and argue that the
"special fund" must compensate applicant for his "unemployability"
as caused by those personal troubles.
In the Camp case, plaintiffs seek to place liability upon
the "special fund" based upon the employee's inability to complete
rehabilitation training, his unsuccessful attempts at marriage
and his troubled childhood.

Plaintiff's can point to no direct
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relationship between these alleged previous conditions and the
applicant's industrial back injury unless they allege that the
combination of his personality problems and his accident have
damaged his employability.

A history of emotional instability,

coupled with an industrial accident is not a disease condition
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.

(1953), Section 35-1-69.

The fact that such emotional problems interfere with the applicant's ability to compete on the job market is not sufficient
cause to incur the liability of Utah's "special fund."
The plaintiff's rely upon recent cases that are not
applicable.

McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 551 P.2d 504 and

567 P.2d 153 is cited as the authority for their position.
McPhie was declared by the medical panel to be 100 perc1
permanently and totally disabled.

Age, education and work avai.

ability were not an element in that case or any of the other ca1
cited by the State Insurance Fund.
Whenever "remainder" is used in the cases cited there
was no reference to the remainder being wholly or partially the
result of age, education or work availability.

McPhie does reli

the purpose of the Second Injury Fund:
One of the purposes of the statue above
(35-1-69) referred to was to encourage
employers to hire handicapped workers by
requiring the Special Fund to assume responsibility should the employee receive
an industrial injury from which he might
become totally disabled from further employment.
The second purpose was to
establish a broader base of responsibility
for pre-existing conditions.
If one of the purposes was to encourage the hiring
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of the handicapped, then we must look to the definition of handicapped for enlightenment.

If the Second Injury Fund is liable

it also becomes necessary to define age, education, and experience
as a prior handicap.

To so define and equate in my opinion is a

stretch of the imagination and a stretch way beyond the stated
purpose.
A handicapped person is defined by the Federal Government
in implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as:
Any person who (a) has a physical
or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such persons major
life activities, (b) has a record of such
impairment, or (c) is regarded as having
such impairment.
The Administrative Law Judge outlined in his Order of
the Merz case (R 257) the difference between impairment and
disability as it applies to these cases.

It is important that

the statute, sec. 69, speaks of impairment and not of disability.
The Judge goes on to say:
The State Insurance Fund contends
that it should be entitled to reimbursement
for 60 percent of all amounts paid during
the last six years by way of weekly compensation benefits and medical expenses.
Such
a conclusion does not necessarily follow.
This throws onto the Second Injury Fund all
of the consequence of the applicant's disability regardless of the relative contribution of the physical impairment sustained
by the applicant in the industrial injury
contrasted to his pre-existing impairment.
The only factors which have resulted in the
applicant no longer being reasonably employable are the fact that he sustained a
40 percent permanent physical impairment
as the result of the industrial accident
and he has become six years older which is
the primary reason for his not being a good
candidate for rehabilitation. Were the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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applicant younger, he almost certainly
would be a candidate for rehabilitation.
His age, therefore, is a dominant factor
in his being disabled.
In fact, preexisting conditions only contribute 15
percent to the applicant's overall impairment or disability, all other factors
having occurred since the time of the
industrial accident.
It follows, therefore, that the State Insurance Fund should
be reimbursed for 15 percent of the expense
it has incurred out of the Second Injury Fund
rather than the 60 percent requested.
The Camp case is a good illustration of how extreme an
example can be made to shift a responsibility to the Second In:
Fund.

There is only a three percent pre-existing impairment at

a 65 percent impairment due to the industrial accident.
to ignore reality and the years of prior decisions

(until

One ha
Orte~

to believe that 68 percent is "substantially greater" than 65
percent.

The State Insurance Fund is now asking a 32 percent r

irnbursement instead of the three percent pre-existing.
Section 69 was intended to compensate prior handicaps.
Age, education, experience and employment opportunities are si1
not incapacities or handicaps intended to be compensated for ur.
that section.
CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission made awards in both these cas
consistant with the findings.

Any increased responsibility

placed upon the Second Injury Fund is without legislative intm
and contrary to all past practices of the Commission.
.
DAE
TD t h is

J,P.~day

of April, 1981
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Assistant Attorney General

MA I L I N G

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing BRIEF
were mailed, postage prepaid this

~y

of April, 1981, to

the following:
Richard I. Ashton, Esq.
Suite 2000
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James R. Black, Esq.
500 Ten West Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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